We consider the problem of dividing indivisible goods fairly among n agents who have additive and submodular valuations for the goods. Our fairness guarantees are in terms of the maximin share, that is de ned to be the maximum value that an agent can ensure for herself, if she were to partition the goods into n bundles, and then receive a minimum valued bundle. Since maximin fair allocations (i.e., allocations in which each agent gets at least her maximin share) do not always exist, prior work has focussed on approximation results that aim to nd allocations in which the value of the bundle allocated to each agent is (multiplicatively) as close to her maximin share as possible. In particular, Procaccia and Wang (2014) along with Amanatidis et al. (2015) have shown that under additive valuations a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists and can be found in polynomial time. We complement these results by developing a simple and e cient algorithm that achieves the same approximation guarantee.
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Even though there is a signi cant body of work aimed at understanding the division of divisible goods, 1 questions related to the fair division of indivisible goods are relatively underexplored. In particular, it is known that fair allocations of divisible goods necessarily exist (with respect to all the previously mentioned solution concepts), however, such guarantees do not hold for indivisible goods; for example, if we have two agents and a single indivisible good, then, under any allocation, the agent that does not get the good will envy the other. Furthermore, classical fairness notions like envy-freeness and proportionality cannot even be approximately satis ed in the case of indivisible goods. 2 Motivated by these observations and the fact that many practical scenarios (such as course allocation at educational institutions [11] and division of inheritance consisting of, say, cars and houses) inherently entail division of discrete goods, recent results have focussed on the problem of fair division of indivisible goods; see, e.g., [1, 7, 11, 32] and references therein. Speci cally, this thread of research has considered notions of fairness 3 which are applicable to indivisible goods, and established existence and computational results for these solution concepts.
One such fairness notion is the maximin share, which is de ned in the notable work of Budish [11] (see also [28] ). Conceptually, maximin share can be interpreted through a discrete (indivisible) generalization of the standard cut-and-choose protocol. In particular, this protocol is used to fairly divide a cake (i.e., a divisible good) between two agents: the rst agent cuts the cake and then the second agent gets to select her favorite piece. Note that a risk-averse agent would cut the cake into two pieces that have equal value for her. In other words, the rst agent will cut (partition) the cake to maximize the minimum value over the pieces in the cut (partition). e protocol leads to a fair allocation in terms of envy-freeness, i.e., it results in an allocation wherein each agent prefers her piece of the cake over the other agent's piece.
Analogously, while dividing indivisible goods among n agents, we can (hypothetically) ask an agent i to partition the goods into n bundles, and then the other agents get to pick a bundle before i. is could possibly lead to agent i ge ing her least desired bundle in the partition. Hence, as in the cut and choose protocol, a risk-averse agent would partition the goods so as to maximize the value of the least desirable bundle (according to her) in the partition. e value that agent i can guarantee for herself by partitioning in this manner is de ned to be agent i's maximin share. An allocation is said to be maximin fair if, for every agent, the value of her bundle is at least as high as her maximin share.
Overall, the maximin share provides an intuitive threshold, and using it, we can deem an allocation to be fair if this threshold is met for every agent. Recent results in the computer science literature have considered whether maximin fair allocations exist and can they be e ciently computed. It turns out that the existence of a maximin fair allocation is not guaranteed [24, 32] . But, this concept lends well to approximation guarantees: Procaccia and Wang [32] have shown that when the agents have additive valuations, one can nd an allocation wherein each agent gets a bundle of value greater than 2/3 times her maximin share, i.e., a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation always exists. e proof of existence by Procaccia and Wang is constructive, but it leads to a polynomial time algorithm only when the number of agents is constant. Extending this result, Amanatidis et al. [1] have developed an algorithm that nds a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation and runs in time polynomial in the number of agents. It is relevant to note that the approximation guarantees obtained in these results and the current paper are absolute, i.e., they guarantee that 1 e metaphor of divisible goods is useful in se ings such as land division. 2 is is true, for example, when we have two agents and a single indivisible good. 3 For example, EF1 [11] , EFX [14] , and maximin shares [11] . there always exists an allocation wherein each agent receives a value at least a constant times her maximin share. e guarantees are not relative to the "best-possible" allocation.
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In the context of indivisible goods, the above mentioned results a rm the relevance of maximin shares as a measure of fairness, but they are con ned to additive valuations. In this paper, we extend this line of work and establish maximin fairness guarantees for both additive and submodular valuations. Given that submodular functions are extensively used in economics and computer science to model preferences, our fairness guarantee for submodular valuations is a compelling generalization of prior work.
Our Results and Techniques: Our rst result ( eorem 2.1) considers fair division of indivisible goods between agents with additive valuations for the goods. In particular, we show that the approximation guarantee obtained in [32] and [1] can be achieved by a simple, 4 combinatorial algorithm. 5 at is, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that nds a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation. To obtain this result we rely on a careful modi cation of an algorithm by Lipton et al. [27] , which, in particular, nds an allocation which is envy free up to one good (EF1); formal de nitions appear in Section 1.1. An arbitrary EF1 allocation might not provide any non-trivial approximation guarantee in terms of the maximin share; see the full version of the paper for an example. Hence, in and of itself, the algorithm of [27] is not guaranteed to nd an allocation that satis es the desired maximin fairness guarantee. Nonetheless, we show that any given additive instance can be reduced (using a result of [7] ) to one with a speci c structure and, then, an instantiation of the algorithm by Lipton et al. [27] (in a particular manner) nds an allocation with the desired fairness guarantee. Our contribution lies in a careful application and analysis of this algorithm.
In addition, we initiate the study of approximate maximin fair division under submodular valuations. Speci cally, we show that when the valuations of the agents are nonnegative, monotone, and submodular, then a 1/10-approximate maximin fair allocation is guaranteed to exist and, in fact, such an allocation can be e ciently found by using a simple round-robin algorithm ( eorem 3.1).
A technical contribution of the paper is to analyze the performance of this simple algorithm by employing the concept of multilinear extensions. is concept has been used in recent results for constrained submodular maximization and, at a high level, it can be thought of as a continuous surrogate (a continuous extension) for a submodular function; see Section 3.2 for a de nition. It is observed in [34] that the multilinear extension-of an agent's valuation function-achieves a high value if the agent is allocated a bundle uniformly at random. We use this observation to show that for each agent, in expectation, a bundle picked uniformly at random approximately satis es the maximin requirement. Intuitively, this fact asserts that a uniformly random allocation is fair, in expectation. But, to obtain the desired approximation guarantee from this fact we cannot directly apply standard techniques (such as pipeage rounding or randomized rounding), since we need to satisfy the maximin requirement for multiple submodular functions simultaneously. 6 Instead, we show that in most rounds (of the round-robin algorithm), the gain in the value of an agent's bundle is comparable to the loss she incurs in the multilinear extension. We do so by de ning the notion of 4 Simple in the sense that our algorithm just entails sorting values and nding cycles in directed graphs. In contrast, the algorithm in [1] uses as a subroutine a PTAS (of Woeginger [36] ) which is based on solving integer linear programs of constant dimension, using Lenstra's algorithm [26] . 5 In fact, we are able to compute a 2n 3n−1 approximate maximin fair allocation in polynomial time. is is slightly be er than the ( 2 3 − ϵ ) approximation guarantee of Amanatidis et al. [1] . 6 Note that, a direct application of randomized rounding leads to a logarithmic approximation guarantee. In particular, the concentration bounds for submodular functions [16] only establish the existence of a 1 O (log n) -approximate maximin fair allocation.
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In the full version of this paper, we also show that a 4/3-approximate maximin fair allocation can be e ciently computed when agents have additive valuations for chores (i.e., negatively valued goods). is improves upon the previously best known 2-approximation of Aziz et al. [4] . 7 Related Work: As mentioned previously, fair division is a well-studied problem in multiple disciplines [10, 29, 31] . In this paper we focus on allocating indivisible goods and, in particular, study the concept of maximin shares. is concept was de ned by [11] as a natural relaxation of fair-share guarantees [30] . In particular, Budish [11] applied this solution concept to the problem of allocating courses to students, and showed that maximin shares for n agents can be guaranteed if some goods are over allocated and the share of each agent is computed with respect to n + 1 agents, instead of n. Note that these allocation errors cannot be ignored when, say, there is only copy of each good, and such a bi-criteria approximation guarantee does not provide any nontrivial multiplicative approximation bounds.
e work of Bouveret and Lemaitre [7] focuses on fair division of indivisible goods with additive valuations. Along with other results, they show that if an allocation is fair with respect to other solution concepts (such as envy freeness and proportionality), then it is maximin fair as well. ey also show that maximin fair allocations are guaranteed to exist for binary, additive valuations. e empirical results presented in [7] suggest that maximin shares invariably exist when the additive valuations are drawn from particular distributions.
Procaccia and Wang [32] also study maximin shares under additive valuations. ey prove that maximin fair allocations do not always exist, but allocations wherein each agent gets a bundle of value greater than 2/3 times her maximin share always exist. e proof of existence in [32] is constructive, but it leads to a polynomial time algorithm only when the number of agents is constant. Amanatidis et al. [1] extend this result by showing that a 2/3-approximate maximin fair allocation can be computed in polynomial time. Kurokawa et al. [24] strengthen the negative result of Procaccia and Wang [32] : they present smaller fair division instances which do not admit maximin fair allocations. In addition, they also show that when the valuations are randomly drawn then maximin fair allocations exist with high probability.
Aziz et al. [4] consider maximin fair allocations for chores (i.e., negatively valued goods). ey show that, even in the case of chores, exact maximin fair allocations do not always exist and they complement this result by developing an e cient algorithm which nds a 2-approximate maximin fair allocation.
Maximin fair division is seemingly related to the well-studied Santa Claus problem [2, 3, 5, 6, 15, 19] , where the goal is to nd an allocation that maximizes the minimum value over all agents. 8 But, note that the Santa Claus problem is an optimization problem-the objective function is the egalitarian social welfare-whereas, in the maximin fair division problem the goal is to nd an allocation that satis es a property (that every agent gets her maximin share). e two problems behave di erently with respect to scaling. In particular, a maximin fair allocation continues to be fair if a single agent scales her valuations, this is not the case with the Santa Claus problem. ese problems di er signi cantly in terms of approximability as well: In the additive valuation case, the best known algorithm for the Santa Claus problem achieves aÕ (n ε )-approximation and runs in time O (n 1 ε ) [15] ; here n is the number of agents and ε > 0. For the submodular valuation case, a 7 In the case of chores the approximation factor is greater than or equal to one. 8 [21] ; here m is the number of goods. On the other hand, as we show in this paper, constant-factor approximation guarantees can be achieved for the maximin fair division problem, even when the valuations are submodular. In notable cases, fair division algorithms have been implemented: (i) Course Match [12] is used for course allocation at Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, (ii) the website Spliddit [22] provides free access to fair division methods, and (iii) the Adjusted Winner Website 9 implements an algorithm of Brams and Taylor [10] to fairly divide goods between two players. ese practical applications enforce the idea that simple/easily implementable fair division algorithms-like the ones developed in this paper-have potential for impact.
Notation and Preliminaries
We let 
Given a subset H ⊆ [m], we will consider marginal values with respect to H and, in particular, de ne the marginal function f H as follows:
Write Π n (S ) to denote the set of all n-partitions of set S ⊆ [m]. With a slight abuse of notation, we will write Π n (m) to denote Π n ([m]). roughout, we will use the word allocation to denote an n-partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) where set A i is allocated to agent i. In addition, an allocation of a strict subset of the goods will be referred to as a partial allocation. We will use the term bundles to denote subsets, A i s, in an (partial) allocation.
Our fairness guarantee is in terms of maximin shares. Formally,
De nition 1.1 (Maximin Share).
For an agent i ∈ [n] and a subset of goods S ⊆ [m], the n-maximin share is de ned to be µ
For ease of presentation, we will use µ i to denote µ n i ([m]) and use maximin share for n-maximin share, whenever n is clear from context. Ideally, we would like to ensure fairness by partitioning the goods such that each agent gets her maximin share, i.e., partition the goods into subsets
Since such partitions do not always exist (see the full version of the paper for an example), a natural goal is to study approximation guarantees. In particular, our objective is to develop e cient algorithms that determine a partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) ∈ Π n (m) wherein each agent, i, gets a bundle,
1:6 Siddharth Barman and Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy
A i , of value (under i ) at least α times her maximin share, with α ∈ (0, 1] being as large as possible. We call such partitions as α-approximate maximin fair allocations. When α = 1, we say that the allocation is maximin fair.
In this work we develop simple and e cient algorithms that achieve this objective with α = 2 3 for additive valuations and α = 1 10 for submodular valuations. Our analysis of the algorithm (for additive valuations) that achieves this result relies, in particular, on understanding the fairness of an allocation in terms of envy. Formally, for an allocation B = (B 1 , . . . , B n ), we say that agent i envies agent j i i prefers j's bundle to her own, i.e.,
). An allocation is de ned to be envy free i no agent envies any other. Since envy-free allocations are not guaranteed to exist with indivisible goods, 10 a natural relaxation (which has been studied in literature; see, e.g., [11] ) is envy free up to one good (EF1): an allocation A is said to be EF1 i for each i, j ∈ [n] there exists a good
In fact, we will show that-for a relevant class of problem instances-our algorithm nds an allocation with is envy free up to the least valued good (EFX) (de ned in [14] ).
De nition 1.2 (Envy free up to the least valued good (EFX)
). An allocation A is said to be envy free up to the least valued good (EFX) i for every i, j ∈ [n] and each good ∈ A j we have
ADDITIVE VALUATIONS
In this section we present an algorithm that e ciently nds a 2 3 -approximate maximin fair allocation under additive valuations.
. Given a set of n agents with additive valuations, { i } i ∈[n] , for a set of m indivisible goods, we can nd a partition (A 1 , . . . , A n ) ∈ Π n (m) in polynomial time that satis es
Here µ i is the maximin share of agent i.
e proof of the theorem proceeds in two parts: (i) First, we show that the problem of nding an approximate maximin fair allocation can be reduced to a restricted se ing where the agents value the goods in the same order. at is, the m goods can be ordered (indexed), say 1 , 2 , . . . , m , such that the valuation of every agent i respects this ordering: for each a < b we have i ( a ) ≥ i ( b ).
(ii) en, we develop a 2/3-approximation algorithm for this restricted se ing.
The Reduction of Bouveret and Lemaître
Intuitively, the greater the con ict of interest among agents, the harder it is to ensure a fairness guarantee. For additive valuations, Bouveret and Lemaître [7] show that it is hardest to guarantee the agents their maximin share when all agents have the same order of preference over the goods. Formally, we say an instance is an ordered instance i there exists a total ordering (≺) over the set of goods [m] such that for all i ∈ [n] and j, j ∈ [m], such that j ≺ j , we have i, j ≥ i, j . erefore, without loss of generality, we can say that an instance is ordered i for all agents i ∈ [n] and goods j, j ∈ [m], such that j < j , we have i, j ≥ i, j , i.e., i,1
Given a fair division instance I = ([n], [m], ) we will construct an ordered instance as follows. First, note that for every agent i ∈ [n], there exists a permutation
. Using these permutations, we de ne a new valuation function, , for every agent i by se ing i, j = i,σ i (j ) for all j ∈ [m]. at is, for agent i, the value of the jth good in the new instance is equal to the jth largest valuation of i in the original instance. We refer to I = ([n], [m], ) as the ordered instance of I . Note that we can nd the ordered instance of I in O (nm log m) time.
Bouveret and Lemaître [7] show that if there is an allocation A which guarantees every agent her maximin share in I , then there is an allocation A that guarantees every agent her maximin share in I . Moreover, given a maximin fair allocation A (for I ), a maximin fair allocation A for the original instance I can be found in polynomial time. In fact, we directly use their proof to show the following slightly stronger statement that such a reduction is possible with respect to any set of scalars, α i s, and not just with respect to the maximin shares. 
1: For all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ A i set p j := i. { is de nes a sequence of agents,
Pick k ∈ arg max ∈R { p j ( )}.
5:
Update A p j ← A p j ∪ {k} and R ← R \ {k}. 
. Moreover, given I and A , A BL computes the allocation A in polynomial time.
P
. Clearly, A BL runs in polynomial time. Now, we will show that A BL computes the required allocation A. Let k j denote the good allocated in the jth iteration of the second for-loop (Steps 3 to 6) in A BL. Now consider agent i, suppose j ∈ A i then k j ∈ A i . Note that, for any j j , we have k j k j ; since, a good is removed from the set R a er it is allocated. Before the jth iteration of the second for-loop in A BL, exactly j − 1 goods had been allocated. erefore k j is among the top j goods for agent i. Hence, for all j ∈ A i , i (k j ) ≥ i (j). is implies that,
Note that the maximin share depends on the values of the goods but not on the order, hence the maximin share of an agent i in an instance I is equal to her maximin share in the ordered instance I . erefore, instantiating eorem 2.2, we have the following corollary. 
Envy Graph Algorithm
As shown in Corollary 2.3, we only need address the se ing in which the agents value the goods in the same order. Hence, in the remainder of this section, we solely focus on ordered instances. at is, we will establish the desired approximation for instances wherein the goods are indexed, say 1 , 2 , . . . , m , such that for every agent i, we have i ( a ) ≥ i ( b ), for all indices a < b. e approximation algorithm given in this section iteratively allocates the goods in decreasing order of value (i.e., in increasing order of their index) and maintains a partial allocation, A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) , of the goods assigned so far. In order to assign a good, the algorithm selects a bundle, A i , by considering a directed graph, G (A), that captures the envy between agents. e nodes in this envy graph represent the agents and it contains a directed edge from i to j i i envies j, i.e., i (A i ) < i (A j ). e following lemma was established in [27] and it shows that we can always "resolve" a partial allocation and obtain an acyclic envy graph. e proof of the lemma is direct, we provide it in the full version of the paper for completeness. 
(ii) e envy graph G (B) is acyclic.
Our algorithm uses Lemma 2.4 and is detailed below. Lemma 2.5 states that A returns an EFX allocation and is proved in the full version of the paper. Pick a vertex i that has no incoming edges in G (A), i.e., i is a source vertex in G (A). { e algorithm maintains the invariant that G (A) is acyclic. Hence, such a vertex is guaranteed to exist.} 5:
if the current envy graph G (A) contains a cycle then 7: Use Lemma 2.4 to update A and, hence, obtain an acyclic envy graph. L 2.5. For any ordered maximin fair division instance, the partial allocation found by A is envy free up to the least valued good (EFX).
Next we introduce the concept of majorization and prove a technical proposition which will be useful in establishing the desired approximation ratio. We say that a multiset X = {x i ∈ R | 1 ≤ 
Here x (i ) ( (i ) ) is the ith largest element of X (Y ). 11 A proof of Proposition 2.6 can be found in [37] . We provide a proof in the full version of the paper as well. P 2.6. Let , ∈ R be two elements of a multiset A of real numbers. In addition, say u, u ∈ R satisfy u + u = + and |u − u | < | − |. en A majorizes (A \ { , }) ∪ {u, u }.
Proof of Theorem 2.1
To establish the stated claim, in the remainder of the proof we will show that 1 (A 1 ) ≥ 2n 3n−1 µ 1 ; an analogous argument establishes the desired bound, i (A i ) ≥ 2n 3n−1 µ i , for all agents i ∈ [n]. Write A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) to denote the allocation returned by the algorithm A . Consider the set of goods that have value more than 1 2 1 (A 1 ); speci cally, de ne τ := arg min{j | 1 ( j ) ≤ 1 2 1 (A 1 )} and let H denote the set of high valued goods H := { 1 , 2 , . . . , τ −1 }. In addition, write P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) to denote the partial allocation that A computes for H . 12 Also, let t denote the smallest iteration count at which A assigns a good (in particular, good t ) to a bundle of size two. Hence, every bundle in the partial allocation of the rst t − 1 goods is of size at most two.
Note that A keeps updating the partial allocations by adding goods to existing bundles. 13 is observation implies that the cardinalities of the bundles in successive partial allocations keep on increasing. is monotonic growth of the bundles also ensures that for each set A i (in the nal allocation A), there exists a unique set P j (in the partial allocation P) such that P j ⊆ A i . Moreover, Lemma 2.4 guarantees that as A progresses the valuation of the agents also does not decrease; in particular, 1 (A 1 ) ≥ 1 (P 1 ).
Let Q = (Q 1 , Q 2 , . . . , Q n ) be the partial allocation considered by A at the beginning of the tth iteration. e de nition of t ensures that |Q i | ≤ 2 for all i ∈ [n]. Below we will show that τ ≤ t and, therefore, using the observation that the cardinalities of the bundles are nondecreasing, we get the following bound:
. is, in turn, leads to the inequality τ ≤ 2n.
Recall that good t was the rst good that was assigned to a set of cardinality two. Write Q b = { x , } to denote this set. Since t is included in Q b , b must have been a source of the acyclic envy graph G (Q). In other words, agent 1 does not envy b's current bundle, 1 
Moreover, since A assigns goods in decreasing order of value, t 's value is no more than that of x and : 1 ( x ) ≥ 1 ( t ) and 1 ( ) ≥ 1 ( t ). erefore, 1 (Q 1 ) ≥ 2 1 ( t ). Since the valuation of agent 1 does not decrease during the execution of A , we get 1 (A 1 ) ≥ 2 1 ( t ). By de nition, τ is the smallest indexed good that satis es this inequality and, hence, the inequality τ ≤ t holds.
We will rst address the bundles that contain a good with index greater than τ − 1. In particular, we establish the following claim. 11 Ties for the ith largest position are broken arbitrarily. 12 Without loss of generality, we can assume that G ( P) is acyclic, since an application of Lemma 2.4 in A simply reassigns the bundles between agents and the constituent bundles in P do not change. 13 ough, the bundle assigned to an agent might change during an application of Lemma 2. In the partial allocation retuned by the A , A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ), the following inequality holds for all bundles the A i that satisfy
P . Consider a bundle A i which contains a good a with index a ≥ τ . Lemma 2.5 implies that 1 (A 1 ) ≥ 1 (A i ) − 1 ( a ) . Also, note that 1 (A 1 ) ≥ 2 1 ( τ ) ≥ 2 1 ( a ); here, the second inequality follows from the fact that the values of the goods are ordered. erefore, the claim holds.
We now need to argue about bundles in A that do not contain any good with index greater than τ − 1. For each such bundle, A i , we have a unique set P j in the partial allocation P such that A i = P j . is follows from the fact that a er the (τ − 1)th iteration no good is allocated to any of these bundles. erefore, to get a handle on bundles in A that do not contain any good with index greater than τ − 1 we will consider the partial allocation P. By de nition, P is a partial allocation of H = { 1 , . . . , τ −1 }, i.e., ∪ n i=1 P i = H . As mentioned above the cardinality of H (i.e., τ − 1) is at most 2n. Write h := max{0, τ − 1 − n}. We will consider the case in which τ ≥ n + 1-and, hence τ − 1 = n + h-the other case wherein τ < n + 1 is simpler and follows analogously. Proof of the following claim can be found in the full version of the paper.
C
2. e partial allocation P consists of (up to reordering) the following bundles:
In the remainder of the proof we say that a partial allocation
Speci cally, we have the following claim for P. e proof of Claim 3 is similar to the proof of Lemma 4 in [37] and appears in the full version of the paper. C 3. Every partial allocation of H (i.e., every R ∈ Π n (H )) majorizes P.
We will now complete the proof of eorem 2.1. Let be the number of bundles in {A 2 , A 3 , . . . , A n } that do not contain any good with index greater than τ − 1. As mentioned above, for every such bundle, A i there exists a unique bundle P j in P such that A i = P j . Say, by reindexing, that P n− +1 , P n− +2 , . . . , P n are these bundles in A that do not satisfy the condition in Claim 1.
Write (M 1 , M 2 , . . . , M n ) denote a partition of the [m] goods that achieves the maximin share for player 1, i.e., min j ∈[n] 1 (M j ) = µ 1 (see De nition 1.1). Consider the partial allocation (M 1 ∩H, M 2 ∩ H, . . . , M n ∩ H ) and index the sets M i s such that 1 
. is inequality along with the fact that the valuations are monotone lead to the following useful bound
Recall that P n− +1 , P n− +2 , . . . , P n are bundles in A, and the remaining (n − ) bundles of A-say, A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n− -satisfy the inequality (1). Since 1 is additive, we have
erefore, inequality (3) provides the following bound 
is completes the proof.
SUBMODULAR VALUATIONS
In this section we show that when the agents have submodular valuations, then a 1 10 -approximate maximin fair allocation is guaranteed to exist and, moreover, it can be found in polynomial time. 14 
Finding an Approximate Maximin Fair Allocation
We compute an approximate maximin fair allocation by employing Algorithm 3 (R R ) as a subroutine. Algorithm 3 is quite direct: it takes as input thresholds, τ i s, for each agent i, allocates high-valued (with respect to τ i ) goods as singleton bundles, and then partitions the remaining goods in a round-robin fashion. e technical contribution here it to show that, for each agent i, as long as τ i is no more than the maximin share µ i , the bundle P i allocated to i by Algorithm 3 satis es i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 τ i . It is relevant to note that this guarantee holds independently for each agent i (as long as τ i ≤ µ i ) and will not be violated even if τ j > µ j for j i. Formally, we establish this guarantee in Lemma 3.2 and use use its contrapositive version (i.e., if Algorithm 3 returns a P i such that i (P i ) < 1 10 τ i , then it must be the case that τ i > µ i ) to establish the main result of this section ( eorem 3.1).
In particular, A S starts by se ing thresholds τ i s, which are guaranteed to be more than the maximin shares. en, it (geometrically) decreases the threshold for agent i, if the partition returned by R R does not satisfy i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 τ i . In such a case, as stated previously, τ i must have been greater than µ i and, hence, decreasing the threshold is justi ed. Overall, in Section 3.4 we show that A S e ciently nds thresholds, for each agent, which are comparable to their maximin share, and establish the following theorem. . A S , in polynomial time, nds an allocation P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) which satis es i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 µ i , for all i ∈ [n]. Here µ i is the maximin share of agent i. We begin by stating R R and establishing its key property, Lemma 3.2. 15 L 3.2. Given a maximin fair division instance with m goods and n agents, whose valuations, i : 2 [m] → R + , are nonnegative, monotone and submodular. Let P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) be the allocation returned by R R for this instance, with thresholds τ i ∈ R + for i ∈ [n]. en, for each agent i whose input threshold satis es τ i ≤ µ i , we have
Here, µ i is the n-maximin share of agent i.
In the full version of the paper, we provide a polynomial-time 1/9-approximation algorithm for computing the maximin share of an agent whose valuation is nonnegative, monotone, and submodular. Hence, we can nd also nd an approximate maximin fair division by a single application of R R (speci cally, by se ing the thresholds τ i s to be 1/9 approximations of the actual maximin shares µ i s). e approximation guarantee obtained by this method, though constant, is worse than A S , which invokes R R polynomially many times.
14 Our results only need oracle access to the submodular functions. 15 Note that this lemma does not rule out the possibility that R R nds a bundle P i which satis es i (P i ) ≥ Output: An allocation P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) such that i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 τ i , for each agent i ∈ [n] whose threshold satis es τ i ≤ µ i . Here µ i is the n-maximin share of agent i.
1: Initialize set of agents A = [n] and set of goods G = [m]. 2: while there exist agent i ∈ A and good j ∈ G such that i (j) ≥ 1 10 τ i do 3:
Allocate P i ← {j}, and update A ← A \ {i} and G ← G \ {j}. 4: end while 5: Assume, via reindexing, that the set of remaining agents A = {1, 2, . . . , |A|}. 6: while G ∅ do 7: for i = 1 to |A| do 8: Pick ∈ arg max j ∈G { i (P i ∪ {j}) − i (P i )}.
9:
end for 11: end while 12: return partition P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ).
Multilinear Extensions and Expected Marginals
Our analysis of R R rests on studying the multilinear extension of the valuation functions. is concept has been used in recent results for constrained submodular maximization; see, e.g. [13, 17, 18, 23, 25, 34, 35] . Formally, 
Here sampling from x ∈ [0, 1] m corresponds to selecting a random subset R ⊆ [m] in which each j ∈ [m] appears independently with probability x j .
We say an n-tuple χ :
. A binary fractional allocation corresponds to a (partial) allocation. Also, note that the set of all fractional allocations forms a partition matroid polytope over the set [m] . Next we state and prove a useful property of the uniform fractional allocation, a proof of which appears in the full version of the paper. In addition, we will say that a vector is supported over a set S i the set of nonzero components of is equal to S. Hence, for u := (
, the projection vector u S ∈ [0, 1] m is supported over S. In addition, the probability of drawing a subset R from u S is nonzero i R ⊆ S.
e following property of multilinear extensions will be used in the proof of eorem 3.1. See the full version of the paper for a proof of this proposition. 
For the analysis of the algorithm, we will de ne the notion of expected ordered marginals γ j s. is notion represents the (expected) marginal of a good j ∈ ⊆ [m] with respect to the goods in that have a lower index than j, i.e., the marginal of j with respect to the set S = {j ∈ | j < j}.
e point is that we take expectation with respect to random draws of S. ese marginals can be used to "locally" express the multilinear extension in a linear form; see Proposition 3.6. Formally, given sets ,
e multilinear extension of a function can be expressed in terms of these marginals as follows. 
. Consider the goods in set = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k } such that j 1 < j 2 < · · · < j k , and let i denote the set of goods in that have a lower index than j i , i.e., i := ∩ [j i − 1] = {j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j i−1 }. Also, let 0 denote the empty set.
For any subset R ⊆ , the de nition of the marginal function implies that
Here 1(j ∈ R) is the indicator function of R. Note that x is supported over and the above equality holds for all R ⊆ , hence, taking expectation we get Next we state a useful property of the expected ordered marginals. e proof of the following proposition appears in the full version of the paper. In the proof we will x an agent i and-under the assumption that τ i ≤ µ i -establish the stated claim, i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 τ i , for i; an analogous argument establishes the claim for all other agents. If agent i was assigned a good in the rst while-loop of R R (Algorithm 3), then we have the desired inequality i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 τ i . Else, the rst while-loop of Algorithm 3 terminates with, say, the good set G = {1, 2, . . . , |G |} (denoting the set of unallocated goods) and agent set A = {1, 2, . . . , |A|} (denoting the set of agents who have not been allocated a single good yet).
Let µ i be agent i's maximin share in this reduced instance,
. Next we will show that µ i ≥ µ i and i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 µ i . Since we are working under the assumption that τ i ≤ µ i , establishing an approximation guarantee in terms of µ i (i.e., nding a |A|-partition (P 1 , . . . , P |A | ) of G such that i (P i ) ≥ 1/10 µ i for all i ∈ A) will prove the lemma. Let M * = (M * 1 , . . . , M * n ) denote a partition that achieves the maximin share with respect to i in the original instance: We will now analyze the second while-loop of Algorithm 3, which allocates the goods in G to agents in A. A complete execution of the inner for-loop (Steps 8-11) will be called a round. So, in every round, each agent i is allocated exactly one good. 16 In the remainder of the proof, f will be used to denote i and F to denote the multilinear relaxation of f . Write µ to denote µ i and u ∈ [0, 1] m to denote the uniform vector 1 n , 1 n , . . . , 1 n . For a particular round r (i.e., for the r th iteration of the inner for-loop): we will use P to denote goods allocated to the agent i before round r , G to denote the unallocated goods before round r , to denote the good allocated to agent i in the round r , and L to denote the set of goods allocated during r . 17 Also, de ne the maximum (expected ordered) marginal lost by the agent in round r as
Recall that u G corresponds to the projection of u onto the set G. We begin by establishing the following inequality for all rounds r : 16 Without loss of generality, we can assume that the number of goods in G is a multiple of |A |. We can do this by adding dummy goods of value 0. 17 e set of unallocated goods a er round r is equal to G \ L and a er the round the bundle allocated to the agent gets updated to P ∪ { }. Also, note that, by de nition, ∈ L. 
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(using Proposition 3.6 and the de nition of r )
With a xed constant α > 1, de ne potential ϕ r , for round r , as ϕ r := max{α f P ( ), r }. e following lemma shows that the "loss" incurred in the multilinear relaxation (due to the allocation of the set L) can be balanced by the potential ϕ r . L 3.8. For any round r ,
P . e de nition of ϕ r implies that
Using this potential, we partition all the rounds into two sets: write D to denote the set of "decrementing" rounds, D := {r | ϕ r = r }, and I to denote the set of "incrementing" rounds as I = {r | ϕ r > r }. Proposition 3.9 bounds the loss incurred in decrementing rounds, see the full version of this paper for a proof. P 3.9. e total loss incurred in decrementing rounds is upper bounded as follows
We can now prove Lemma 3.2. Using Lemma 3.8 we get the following lower bound on the sum of the potentials
Since a round is either incrementing or decrementing, we can write r ϕ r = r ∈ D ϕ r + r ∈I ϕ r . erefore, Recall that ϕ r = r for all r ∈ D. Hence, Proposition 3.9 gives us r ∈I ϕ r ≥ 1 − e −1 1 + α −1 µ − 0.1 1 − α −1 µ.
Let P be the nal set of goods allocated to agent i. e fact that for all incrementing rounds the potential ϕ r is equal to α times the marginal gain of the agent, i.e., ϕ r = α f P ( ) for all r ∈ I, gives the upper bound α f ( P ) ≥ r ∈I ϕ r . erefore, the nal bundle allocated to the agent satis es f ( P ) ≥ To recap, we have proved that when agent i is assigned a good in the rst while-loop of R R , then agent i gets a high valued good; i.e., f ( P ) ≥ 0.1τ i . When agent i is not assigned a good in the rst while-loop of R R , then R R terminates with f ( P ) ≥ Overall, the condition that τ i ≤ µ implies the desired inequality-f ( P ) ≥ 0.1τ i -in this case as well. Output: An allocation P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) such that, i (P i ) ≥ For all i ∈ V , update τ i ← 1 (1+δ ) τ i .
5:
Update the partition by executing R R with the current threshold values: (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) ← R R (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ).
6:
Update V ← {i | i (P i ) < 1 10 τ i } 7: end while 8: return Partition P = (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n )
Proof of Theorem 3.1
In A S the initial value of τ i (= i ([m]) ) is guaranteed to be at least µ i . Furthermore, Lemma 3.2 ensures that, for each agent i, A S never decrements τ i below 1 1+δ µ i . erefore, when A S terminates, for every agent i, the nal threshold value τ i satis es τ i ≥ 1 1+δ µ i and i (P i ) ≥ 1 10 τ i (since V = ∅ at termination). In other words, A S returns (P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n ) which satis es i (P i ) ≥ 1 10(1+δ ) µ i for all i ∈ [n] and, hence, satis es the desired approximate fairness guarantee. Note that we can tighten the analysis of Lemma 3.2 to obtain an approximation factor slightly be er than 1 10 . 18 Hence, with an appropriately small constant δ ∈ (0, 1), we can obtain the approximation guarantee of 1/10 (as stated in eorem 3.1), instead of the slightly worse bound 1 10(1+δ ) . Finally, we can bound the running time of A S by observing that initially τ i = i ([m]) and, hence, the maximum number of times that agent i is contained in set V is log (1+δ )
. 19 Overall, this bound ensures that the algorithm runs in polynomial time. 18 We did not optimize the parameters for ease of presentation. 19 As stated in the algorithm, agents whose maximin share is zero can be removed from consideration. e algorithms developed in this paper nd allocations that are not only (approximately) fair but also sequenceable. Sequenceable allocations are allocations that can be obtained by ordering the agents and then le ing them select their most valued unallocated good one a er the other; see [9] for a formal de nition. Bouveret and Lemaître [8] have studied this notion as an e ciency measure and shown that every Pareto-optimal allocation is also sequenceable. is observation leads to the open, interesting question of whether we can e ciently compute allocations which are both (approximately) fair and Pareto optimal.
In a recent preprint Ghodsi et al. [20] have also obtained constant-factor approximation guarantees for maximin fair division under additive and submodular valuations. In addition, they consider more general valuation functions; speci cally, they obtain a constant-factor approximation for XOS valuations and a logarithmic approximation for subadditive valuations. Understanding if the ideas developed in this paper-along with [20] , [32] , and [1]-can be used to address fair division of indivisible goods among strategic agents remains an interesting direction for future work.
